Reclaiming Data: Overcoming app identification barriers for exercising
  data protection rights by Norval, Chris et al.
Author preprint (accepted 20-Aug-18) To appear in the proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Legal and Technical Issues in
Cloud and Pervasive Computing (IoT) [CLaw-18], UbiComp/ISWC’18 Adjunct, https://doi.org/10.1145/3267305.3274153
Reclaiming Data: Overcoming App Identification
Barriers for Exercising Data Protection Rights
Chris Norval, Jennifer Cobbe, Heleen Janssen, Jatinder Singh
Department of Computer Science & Technology
University of Cambridge, UK
firstname.lastname@cl.cam.ac.uk
Abstract—Data protection regulations generally afford individ-
uals certain rights over their personal data, including the rights to
access, rectify, and delete the data held on them. Exercising such
rights naturally requires those with data management obligations
(service providers) to be able to match an individual with their
data. However, many mobile apps collect personal data, without
requiring user registration or collecting details of a user’s identity
(email address, names, phone number, and so forth). As a result,
a user’s ability to exercise their rights will be hindered without
means for an individual to link themselves with this ‘nameless’
data. Current approaches often involve those seeking to exercise
their legal rights having to give the app’s provider more personal
information, or even to register for a service; both of which seem
contrary to the spirit of data protection law. This paper explores
these concerns, and indicates simple means for facilitating data
subject rights through both application and mobile platform (OS)
design.
Index Terms—identity management, data protection, privacy,
GDPR, subject access rights, mobile applications
I. INTRODUCTION
A key aim of data protection law is to give individuals
increased transparency, accountability, and control over their
personal data. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [3]1 modernises and strengthens the rights of data
subjects2 in relation to how their personal data is collected and
processed by data controllers3 – regardless of which country
that data controller is based. The GDPR provides several rights
which a data subject may wish to exercise. For example, the
‘right of access’4 gives the data subject the ability to access
personal data held about themselves by a data controller.
Data subjects can also request the correction of incorrect data
through the ‘right to rectification’,5 or the deletion of their
1In this paper we focus on the GDPR, recognising that similar principles
will be relevant to similar legal frameworks in other jurisdictions.
2An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity of that natural person. GDPR, Art 4(1).
3The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which,
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data. GDPR, Art 4(7).
4GDPR, Art 15.
5GDPR, Art 16.
data through the ‘right to erasure’ (commonly referred to as
the ‘right to be forgotten’),6 among others.
Many mobile applications (‘apps’) entail the collection and
(server-side) processing of data, which is often personal in
nature and therefore subject to such rights. However, many
of these apps operate without requiring registration (sign-
in) mechanisms, and do not collect other identity-related
information (email address, name, etc). This situation leads to
the challenge for individuals attempting to exercise their rights:
how does a user (data subject) supply sufficient information
to allow the app’s provider to identify the user’s data so as to
action the request?7 8
App providers will generally use some identifier(s) to
uniquely differentiate data from a particular device/user –
typically those provided by the mobile platforms (operating
systems). Yet, these identifiers are generally not accessible
to end-users. Without identifiers which are both available
to end-users and app providers, it may be difficult (perhaps
impossible) to link a user with their data on the app provider’s
systems.
Towards this, current approaches seem to involve the user
having to supply additional data about themselves in order
to exercise their rights. This might entail the user having to
sign-up for the service in question or sign in to a third-party
identity provider (e.g. Facebook) in order to bridge the divide.
Neither of these may be desirable, not least because the user
may be trying to limit the data held by the controller rather
than provide them with more. Indeed, such approaches appear
contrary to the spirit of the data protection law.
This paper explores issues regarding user identification and
exercising legal rights in the context of apps, suggesting simple
ways forward for both app providers and mobile platforms.
In line with other work (e.g. [16]), we generally seek to
raise awareness of how technology design impacts rights,
6GDPR, Art 17.
7By ‘app provider’, we refer to the entity responsible for the provision of
the service.
8By ‘identify’, we refer to the act of technically matching a given
user/device with their data through common identity information — not the
act of verifying the authenticity of a rights request once received.
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highlighting the need to account for data subject rights as part
of app development.
II. MOBILE APPS, DATA COLLECTION & SUBJECT RIGHTS
Many apps will involve the generation or collection of
personal data which is sent back to the app’s provider for
processing.9 Yet, many users may be unaware of the nature and
scale of such data collection, or might have general questions
about how their data is being used.10 As such, the rights
afforded by the GDPR are powerful tools for transparency,
accountability, and user agency.
While many of the GDPR’s requirements are not new,11 its
renewed emphasis on data subject rights and the regulatory
fines it provides for non-compliance have, for many, brought
these issues into sharp focus. However, the GDPR’s complex-
ity, and the fact that many individuals and organisations are
only now properly beginning to consider these issues, could
mean that app providers are subject to the requirements of
the GDPR without realising it. For example, personal data
is any data which relates to an identified or identifiable
natural person; that is, one who can be identified directly
or indirectly.12 As such, data that does not directly include
identity information about the individual can also fall within
the scope of the GDPR [9, 11].13
In short, where the data can be linked to a particular individ-
ual — whether they are known or identified to the app service
provider or not — it will be personal data against which GDPR
rights can be exercised. Yet, some app providers may not even
realise that such data is within the scope of data protection
regulations, or even what their data protection obligations are.
Consequently, the requirements of the GDPR may not have
been considered during the design and development of such
an app. In turn, this may result in circumstances where the
data subject has few means for identifying themselves so as
to exercise their rights over that data.
A. Qualifications and Exceptions
Data controllers are generally obliged by the GDPR to
facilitate the exercise of data subject rights, including taking
the necessary technical and organisational measures to permit
their exercise, and should not obstruct data subjects who are
doing so.14 However, there are two circumstances in which
this is not necessarily the case. In each, the onus is on the
data controller to demonstrate that the circumstance exists.
9 Though not all apps do this, it is very common for apps to involve data
transfer and processing on remote servers (cloud), as opposed keeping and
processing all data only on the device.
10Ofcom recently found that a majority of UK-based Internet users that
responded to a survey were unaware that some apps “collect data on users’
locations, or on what products or services interest them" [12].
11The GDPR’s predecessor, the Data Protection Directive [2], was passed
in 1995 and contained most of the same data subject rights.
12GDPR, Art 4(1).
13Research has repeatedly shown that even anonymized data can often be
re-identified and attributed to specific individuals [15], and there is ongoing
discussion about the extent to which non-personal data should even exist as
a concept given that “in increasingly ‘smart’ environments any information
is likely to relate to a person in purpose or effect" [14].
14GDPR, Arts 12 and 25; Recitals 59 and 78.
The first of these circumstances is in relation to services
which do not require the identification in some way of
individual end-users (i.e. where they are not providing a
personalised service or linking data coming to and from a
device as belonging to a particular app instance, etc.) and
where the data controller can demonstrate that they aren’t
in a position to identify the data subject.15 This could be,
for example, a weather app which includes coarse-grained
location information in a request for forecast data and where
the app provider only stores this information in aggregate.
In these cases, data controllers are under no obligation to
provide means for data subjects to be identified, and certain
data subject rights don’t apply unless the data subject provides
sufficient identifying information (once a data subject has
identified themselves by providing the necessary information,
the controller must according to Article 11(2) of the GDPR
proceed to meet its request).16
Yet a distinction should be drawn between cases where
a) the service provided does not need to collect identifying
information (e.g. as above) and b) situations where the service
does need to identify users (say, to provide a personalised
experience), but the data controller simply does not collect
the information which would allow them to link users with
their personal data. In the latter case, users would not be
able to effectively exercise their data subject rights, and
failure to fulfil data subject requests would be a breach of
the GDPR. Appropriate technical and organisational measures
should therefore be implemented by the controller in order to
meet the requirements of the GDPR.17
The second circumstance in which data controllers may not
be obliged to facilitate the exercise of data subject rights is
where the data subject’s request is manifestly unfounded or
excessive (in these cases the data controller may refuse the
request or may elect to charge a fee).18 For this to apply,
as in relation to the first circumstance discussed above, the
data controller must themselves demonstrate that the request
is either manifestly unfounded or excessive; however, this may
prove challenging, given the technical ease of linking data via
queries for instance.
To summarise, there are many situations where data col-
lected by apps — even those which do not collect directly
identifiable data — are subject to the rights afforded by the
GDPR. Yet, as discussed in the Introduction, this is possible
only where some shared identifier(s) (or some other means)
exist to link a data subject with their data. Therefore, the
technical attributes and capabilities of these identifiers are an
important part of this discussion.
III. IDENTIFIERS AND DEVICES
Apps that involve ‘off-device’ (i.e. server/cloud) data pro-
cessing will typically use identifiers, of some form, against
which a data ‘profile’ is built. We use ‘profile’ to describe data
15GDPR, Art 11.
16GDPR, Recital 57.
17GDPR, Art 25.
18GDPR, Art 12(5).
associated with a particular user as seen through the eyes of
the ‘off-device’ service. In practice, this could be a dataset
associated with an identified, but otherwise unnamed, user
of the app. Note that our usage is distinct from ‘profiling’
as outlined in the GDPR, which defines it as “any form of
automated processing of personal data consisting of the use
of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating
to a natural person”.19
As discussed, where apps collect data that can directly
identify an individual user (e.g. email address or username),
it should generally be possible for the provider (when given
identifying information by the data subject) to uncover the
data/profile associated with that user. This might be, for
instance, by way of simple database queries. This means that
a data subject seeking to exercise their rights (should) need
only to provide this identity information in order for the
data controller to action their request (generally after some
verification process). Note that the internal identifier used by
such apps to associate user data needn’t necessarily be the
identity information itself (e.g. the email address), as long as
that identity information links to something with which that
user’s data is associated (e.g. an internal identifier string for
the data profile).
For apps which do not require signing up or the provision
of any identifiable data, generally some form of profile for
a particular user will still be created. This may be through
an identifier which is specific to the device, such as a serial
number, or it could be a programmatically generated identifier
provided by the platform or the app’s developer at the instance
the app started for the first time. Given that (a) many of
these programmatic identifiers are neither comprehensible nor
accessible to end-users, and (b) the app provider may have no
other identity information, the key issue is the limited means
with which individuals can assert their identity and thereby
have app providers uncover which data profile belongs to them.
See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
A. Platform managed identifiers
App providers require identifiers to help manage the data
associated with a user. Though an app can create its own
identifier,20 given the commonality and general need for such
functionality, the mobile platforms have in-built programmatic
methods to facilitate user/device identification. In the earlier
days of iOS and Android (<2013), many apps would use some
form of alphanumerical string which was unique for the par-
ticular device, such as Settings.Secure.ANDROID_ID
(SSAID) on Android, or the Unique Device Identifier (UDID)
on iOS. These (generally) immutable device-centric identifiers
were accessible to app developers, and every app on the
device would see the same identifier value. Importantly, these
identifiers were also accessible to the device owners, though
at varying levels of ease. In such situations, one could imagine
19GDPR, Art 4(4).
20For example, a random string generated on the first execution of an app
that is used with future interactions with their server(s).
Phone
App 1
User_ID: A06F9
App 2
User_ID: A35D8
App 1 Developer
[data controller]
User
[data subject]
ID (e.g. name)
(2) No
Records 
Found
User_ID: A06F9
…
…
(1) Name
Personal data
Fig. 1. Example where a user generates and transmits personal data
via an app to a data controller. Since the user has no access to their
User_ID on App 1, and the app provider has no access to other
identifiable data (e.g. name), it becomes difficult to match the user
with their data to facilitate the user’s data protection rights.
a user providing their device identifier to an app provider to
assist with their exercising of rights.
The identifier landscape, however, has since evolved. Recog-
nising the privacy and security implications of allowing all
apps to access the (same) identifiers that uniquely refer to
a specific device, the iOS App Store review process began
rejecting apps which accessed the UDID in 2012. This fol-
lowed media reports that some app providers were sharing
these identifiers with advertising companies for cross-app
profiling purposes [10]. Apple created a new identifier for iOS
developers to use, identifierForVendor (IDFV), which
is unique to each device and developer account combination.21
This allows a particular app provider to get the same identifier
across their applications but will give apps from different de-
veloper accounts a different value (e.g. see Fig. 1), preventing
the matching of a single device across different providers.
Like Apple, Google began discouraging the use of hardware
identifiers on Android,22 eventually changing how the SSAID
identifier worked. From Android O (v8, 2017), requesting the
SSAID returned a different value for each app instance [6],23
and thus it could no longer be used for cross-app profiling
purposes.
Yet it appears that neither the IDFV or the (Android O
onwards) SSAID for a given app are accessible or visible
to users, unless specifically implemented into the application
itself. And while the platforms do provide some identifiers
which are end-user accessible, these typically come with
restrictions. For example, Apple and Google both provide
resettable, user-accessible identifiers for advertising purposes:
advertisingIdentifier (IDFA) on iOS,24 and Adver-
21See: identifierForVendor on the Apple Developer Documenta-
tion [1].
22See: Best practices for unique identifiers on the Android Developer
Documentation [7].
23Note the subtle differences between IDFV and (new) SSAID. IDFVs
are unique for a given developer account and device combination, whereas
SSAIDs are unique for a given app and user on a device.
24See: advertisingIdentifier and ASIdentifierManager on the Ap-
ple Developer Documentation [1].
tising ID on Android [8]. These allow app providers and
advertisers to track users/devices for advertising and profiling
purposes – yet with added functionality that allows the user
to control (i.e. reset or block the use of) their advertising
identifier.
While these advertising identifiers may have been effective
technical mechanisms for linking users with their data, both
iOS and Android discourage their use beyond advertising.
Google Play’s (Android) Developer Policy Center forbids
associating the Advertising ID with any personally identifiable
information or persistent device identifiers [8]. The iOS App
Store actively rejects apps which use the IDFA for purposes
beyond advertising [13] (e.g. when an app requests this
identifier but adverts aren’t enabled within the app). Apps
which access these identifiers for uses other than advertising
may find themselves rejected from the platform marketplace’s
review process.
The technical workings and permitted use of identifiers
on both iOS and Android have evolved. Platforms provide
app developers with identifiers with different properties, to be
used for different purposes. However, for the most part, these
identifiers are designed to assist the developers/app providers
rather than being user-facing. In the context of users exercising
their legal rights, we argue that more needs to be done to raise
awareness of issues relating to the rights of data subjects, as
is a greater consideration of how technical mechanisms can
assist users in exercising these rights.
IV. THE USER NEED FOR IDENTIFIERS
To recap, without an identifier which is both user-facing
and collected by the app developer/provider, matching an
individual to their data — and therefore permitting them to
exercise their rights — may be difficult, and in some cases
impossible. This is unless other methods have been considered
and implemented into the app in advance, which relies on a
prior awareness (and willingness) by those that designed the
app. Casual observation of various apps shows that exercising
rights often requires the provision of further data, for instance,
linking to a third-party sign-on service (e.g. Facebook), or
forcing the registration of an account. This intuition is that this
works to associate some identity information with the existing
data profile, which then allows the individual to identify
themselves (and therefore their data profile) to exercise their
rights.
However, it is arguable that forcing an individual to provide
more personal information — or indeed, to sign up for an
account just to exercise their rights — runs against the spirit
of data protection regulations. Given that such registration
was otherwise unnecessary, this appears to serve more in
the interests of the service provider than the user. That is,
a provider may benefit from having another registered user,
access to more data, and from service ‘lock-in’ effects. In some
ways, a forced registration process could be considered a ‘dark
pattern’ [4]. Further, it may act as a deterrent, as those who do
not wish to provide such additional data may be discouraged
from exercising their rights.
As such, there is a need for greater discussion and awareness
about how users can best identify themselves in order to
exercise their GDPR rights on mobile apps. We now outline
two potential approaches to addressing this problem: one
involving functionality built into the app itself, and another
outlining how the platforms could implement features which
facilitate the identification process.
App providers should add functionality to help users
identify themselves
Clearly, there are steps which an app provider could take
to facilitate the identification of users. For example, identifiers
could be exposed within the app itself. This could be the actual
identifier that the app provider uses internally, or perhaps an
identifier created solely for the purposes of matching a user
with their data. The latter approach could allow for more user-
friendly approaches, such as the use of mnemonic phrases
(unique combinations of words), rather than pseudo-random
alphanumeric strings of characters which users may have to
carefully copy out. The identifier could be printed within the
options of the app, such as in a Help or Support tab, or
dynamically written into a privacy notice included within that
app.
Such a feature may even make use of existing functionality,
requiring limited or no further app development. For example,
we recently submitted a ‘right of access’ (subject access)
request to an app provider who then asked us to send a URL
provided by the app’s Share feature. This URL contained a
unique code which was then used to identify our ‘nameless’
profile from the app provider’s system. By providing them
with this URL, it enabled the identification of our data and
our request was fulfilled.
Alternatively, and arguably better, would be to allow app
providers to explore more proactive means for exercising
rights. For example, providing functionality or a direct link
within the app for exercising these rights; i.e. at the click of a
button. However, this requires each app provider to consider
and implement these more involved features into their apps.
In practice, app providers must consider how they should
respond to a rights request, and the technical measures they
employ to facilitate this. However, at present, it appears that
many app providers seem unaware of the issues, not least as
some fairly simple methods could assist, for example, with
user identification. To move forward, there is a need for greater
levels of awareness regarding rights concerns, as well as a
wider understanding about the incentives and advantages of
thinking about technical measures for exercising such rights.
Regulatory pressure could also play a role as precedent begins
to emerge around the GDPR’s enforcement.
Mobile platforms could allow users to view the identifiers
used by their apps
There is also scope for the platforms to facilitate data
subjects exercising their rights, through simple changes to the
way user identification is handled. Currently, there appears no
practical way for a user to uncover iOS’s IDFV and Android’s
app-specific SSAID for a given app on a device. From a
platform perspective, functionality could be added that allows
a user to view their allocated identifiers for all of the apps
on their device. For instance, this could be presented to the
user in a table from within the phone’s settings menu, or
under information regarding the installed app in question.
This would ensure that any user could look up an app that
they use and find the relevant identifier(s), which can assist
controllers in identifying the relevant data for that given user.
Retaining and including identifiers which are no longer current
(i.e. uninstalled apps) within such a table could give the
user full control over current and past profiles alike. This
simple functionality would go some way towards facilitating
the exercising of rights, short of active intervention from the
app providers themselves.
Of course, this is not a silver bullet; the identifier provided
in this menu may not necessarily be an identifier that the app
provider collects or uses. That said, it is common practice
that app providers collect these platform-provided identifiers
— even if they are not the identifiers that are used internally by
the app to build data profiles — and this therefore represents
a means to assist identification in many cases.
More involved steps could see the platforms requiring
that apps use a particular identifier, or alternatively spec-
ify whichever identifier is being used (e.g. in an app’s
manifest,25 or programatically). These identifiers could
then be made accessible to the user, as described above.
Given the platforms’ application marketplaces entail a val-
idation process (where access to other restricted identifiers
is already checked), various methods could be employed to
ensure conformance in a similar manner.
Regardless, having the mobile platforms taking even basic
actions towards facilitating the exercising of data protection
rights would raise the profile of data protection issues both
with users and app providers alike. It would serve as a strong
signal that providers need to take such concerns seriously.
It may also begin a move towards a new and improved set
of best practices for identification and rights management.
Moreover, building features which facilitate rights requests
into the mobile platforms leaves little room for controllers
to argue against non-compliance due to technical reasons or
on grounds of excessive effort, particularly as regulators will
quickly become aware of such functionality being added to
the two main mobile platforms.
It remains to be seen whether large platforms would
implement these features without a clear demand for such
changes from either app providers/developers or end-users.
Such demand may be slow to develop, given the apparent lack
of awareness of these issues. That said, even the basic solutions
mentioned would be simple to implement and would go a long
way towards empowering users and improving compliance
with data protection regulations.
V. DISCUSSION
There appears a need for improving the technical mecha-
nisms that enable users to exercise their rights. As the profile of
25See: App Manifest Overview on the Android Developer Documenta-
tion [7].
data protection concerns continues to rise, best practices and
design patterns are likely to emerge. This particularly given
the GDPR’s requirements for data protection by design and
default.26
In terms of moving forward, having such features built
directly into the platform gives some means for users to
help identify themselves,27 regardless of whether the app
provider explicitly provides mechanisms facilitating identity
or data protection rights management. Moreover, having such
functionality explicitly built into the device’s OS, accessible
to users, highlights the importance of exercising rights, and
raises users expectations regarding the apps they use. This
works to incentivise conformance by app providers to either
use or build-in means to help with identification and rights
management. And by having such functionality available,
where an app provider does not comply, users and regulators
alike will know that mechanisms are possible, which works to
limit excuses for non-compliance.
This discussion represents just the starting point. There is
a strong case for apps to have built-in means for directly
facilitating the exercising of data protection rights, i.e. through
the click of a button. However, a process for managing the
validity of any rights requests is relevant for any app collecting
personal data. Is the user actually the individual? Has someone
got hold of their unlocked phone? For example, where there
is no sign-in for an app, entering the device’s lock/fingerprint/
biometric screen could perhaps help. At the same time, while
in-app authentication mechanisms may make sense in certain
contexts, they could also act as a hindrance; such obstacles,
depending on their implementation, might work to obstruct
those wishing to exercise their rights. Questions also arise in
situations where a device is shared, such as a tablet used by
several family members.
Another consideration is the degree of automation appro-
priate for exercising rights; for example, it may make sense to
separate identity and rights functionality from the operation
of the app, as a means to prevent someone masquerading
as the user. Also relevant are the security risks associated
with identifiers: how should identifiers be managed, and what
mitigations are in place if an identifier is leaked or otherwise
compromised? All of the above issues require further thought,
especially as an unwarranted rights request could cause far
more harm than the general usage of the app. What is
appropriate will of course depend on the circumstances and
risk profile of the particular application.
Ultimately, exercising rights represents a legal obligation,
and so there is both the need and opportunity for app providers
and mobile platforms to do more. Data subject identification
is an ongoing discussion (see, for example, multi-user IoT
devices [17] and web tracking through shadow profiles [5]),
and there is much potential for future work in the space.
Raising awareness of the technical implications of rights is
key, not least because technical mechanisms — even those
26GDPR, Art 25(1).
27Again, it might not help in all cases, depending on whether the application
actually records these specific platform-provided IDs.
with privacy in mind — may work to hinder individuals from
exercising their rights [16]. By exploring such issues in a
mobile app context, and suggesting simple actions that can
be taken, our goal is to encourage new ways forward in data
protection by design.
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